Fred H. LaFrentz and Evelyn D. LaFrentz v. Melvin Blake, Morris Johnson and Lorain Johnson : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Fred H. LaFrentz and Evelyn D. LaFrentz v. Melvin
Blake, Morris Johnson and Lorain Johnson : Brief
of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cline, Wilson & Cline; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, LaFrentz v. Blake, No. 7360 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1142
In the Supreme Court 
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R. & B. Cafe, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
FRED H. LAFRENTZ and 
EVELYN D. LAFRENTZ, doing 
business under the firm name 
and style of LaFrentz Liquid 
Gas Company, 
Pta?,nt~tts and Appellants, Case No. 7361 
vs. 
MUHHl~ JOHNSON and 
LUHAlN JOHNSON, doing bus-
Iness under the firm name and 
style of Horseshoe Uafe, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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- "'- ~ w.v Attot·neys for Appellants. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~-,RED H. LAFRENTZ and 
EVELYN D. LAFRENTZ, doing 
business under the firm name 
and style of LaFrentz Liquid 
Gas Company, 
Plaintiffs and .Appellants, 
vs. 
MELVIN BLAKE, doing business 
under the name and style of 
R. & B. C~fe, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
FRED H. LAFRENTZ and 
EVELYN D. LAFRENTZ, doing 
business under the -firm name 
and style of LaFrentz Liquid 
Gas Company, 
.Pla~nt~tts and Appellants, 
vs. 
lVLUHHl~ JOHNSON and 
LUHAlN JOHNSON, doing bus-
Iness under the firm name and 
style of Horseshoe Uafe, 
Defendants and Respondents .. 
Case No. 7360 
.Case No. 7361 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
·' STATEJ\fENT OF TilE. CASES 
The within appeals are taken by the plaintiffs from 
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adYerse judgments render~d in favor of the defendants 
by the District Court of Piute County, Utah, Hon. John 
L. SeYy, Jr., Judge. 
These t\YO cases have been consolidated for the pur-
pose of this brief. They "\vere, under stipulation, and by 
order of the trial court, consolidated for the purpose of 
trial; and by stipulation of the parties,, through their re-
~pectiYe counsel, the Bill of Exceptions settled by the trial 
court is to be considered on appeal as the Bill of Excep-
tions in each of the cases. 
Aside from the differences i.n parties defendant and 
property involYed, the pleadings and issues in each of the 
cases are the same, the facts and the points of law in-
volved are practically identical. 
Plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants in 're-
plevin to repossess person~l property, claiming to_ be 
the owners thereof. Defendants answered claiming own-
ership of the property. The trial court held with th~ de-
fendants and entered judgments accordingly. The within 
appeals are taken by the plaintiffs from such adverse 
judgments which refused plaintiffs any relief and award-
ed possession of the property to the de~endants. 
Respecting the case in 'vhich l\felvin Blake is named 
as defendant, plaintiff brought suit to recover the posses--
sion of one 573 gallon liquid gas storage tank of the value 
of $300.00, or for the value thereof in case a delivery 
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could not be had. The complaint is in the usual form, 
alleging that at the time of the commencement of the 
action and for some time prior thereto the plaintiffs were 
/ 
entitled to the immediate possession of such personal 
property;· that the defendant came into the possession 
thereof from one Ervin C. Lay who obtained possession 
from the plaintiffs, and that the defendants were then in 
the possession thereof; that plaintiffs demanded posses-
sion from· the defendant who refused to give up posses-
sion; and that the defendant wilfully and wrongfully 
retains and withholds possession from the plaintiffs. The 
complaint alleges a damage for the withholding of the 
property; but plaintiffs elected at the trial not to press 
the claim for such damages and therefore made no proof 
thereof. (Case No. 7360, Abs. R. 1-3). The answer denies 
that plaintiffs were the owners of the_ gas storag·e tank 
and alleges that the defendant is the owner thereof. The 
answer a.dmits that the defendant came into possession 
of the property through Ervin C. Lay and alleges that 
defendant is now in possession, that he is the owner of 
the tank and that he is entitled to the possession thereof. 
The answer denies any demand for possession of the 
property but alleges if such demand had been made the 
defendant would have refused to surrender the posses-
sion to plaintiffs or anyone else. (Case No. 7360, Abs. 
R. 8-9). 
Respecting the case 1n which Morris Johnson and 
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Loraine Johnson are the defendants, plaintiffs brought 
suit to recover the possession of one 320 gallon liquid gas 
storage tank of the value of $200.00, or for the value 
thereof in case a delivery could not be had. The complaint 
alleg·es that the defendants "'rere during all of the times 
therein stated, co-partners, and inn all other respects the 
allegations are similar to those in the Blake case. (Case 
No. 7361, Abs. R. 1-3). The answer admits the co-partner-
ship of the defendants and in all other respects it is sim-
ilar to the admissions and denials set forth. in the Blake 
case. (Case No. 7361, Abs. R. 8-9). 
On the above pleadings the cases proceeded to trial. 
On stipulation of the parties the court ordered the cases 
consolidated for purpose of trial. (Trans. 3 and 4). 
Some months after trial the court rendered its decision 
in each case finding ·for the defendants and against the 
plaintiffs, whereupon findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were entered and a decree entered accordingly in 
each case. 
In the Blake case, No. 7360, the court found that the 
defendant was the owner of and entitled to the possession 
of the storage tank; that payment had been made there-
for, and that the possession of the defendant was rightful 
and valid. It will be observed that the court did not find 
that the plaintiffs had llllt been paid for the tank, nor do 
the findings show 'vhen or where payment was made and 
by or to "'"hom. In fact, the court made no findings what-
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·ever as to how the plaintiffs, stipulated to have been the 
owners of the tank, lost their title. The court concluded 
the defendant was the owner of and entitled to the undis-
turbed possession of the property and a decree was en-
tered accordingly. (Abs. R. 12-13). 
In the Johnson case, No. 7361, the court found that 
the defendants were co-partners doing business under the 
firm natpe and style of Horseshoe Cafe; that the defend-
ants are the· owners and entitled to the possession of the 
storage tank, that payment had bee:p. fully arid completely 
made for the property and that the possession was right-
ful and valid in the defendants. It will be observed that 
in this case also the court did not find that the defendants 
made payment for the tank to the plaintiffs, nor do the 
findings show when or where payment was made or to 
_whom, nor how the plaintiffs, stipulated to have been the 
owners, lost their title. The court concluded the defend-
ants were the owners and entitled to the undisturbed pos-
session of the property and a decree was entered accord-
ingly. (Abs. R._14). 
STATE~IENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiffs are co-partners in a business operated 
at Cedar City, Utah, known as LaFrentz Liquid Gas Com-
pany. This company serves itome and business houses 
with liquified gas for cooking, heating and refrigeration. 
In the operation of such business the plaintiffs furnish 
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rc·rtain equipment consisting of tanks, regulators, fittings, 
pipes, etc. \'Then the liquified gas contained in the tanks 
!s exhausted the· tanks are refilled with a new supply. 
(Trans. 5-6). 
Tanks, rylinders and other equipment used for stor-
-age of liquified gas were leased by the plaintiffs to their 
~ealers on a lease rental basis, while gas burning appli-
ances such as stoves, heating panels, re~rigerators and 
the like were sold outright to their dealers. ( Tr. 34_ and 
Ex. 1). 
The plaintiffs did not sell directly to consumers, but 
ga \Te franchises to dealers, under the terms of which the 
plaintiffs, as distributors, leased tanks and appurtenant 
equipment needed and used for the storing and keeping 
of liquid gas used in gas burning appliances, but sold to 
the dealer gas burning appliances and the liquid gas for 
refilling storage tanks, which the dealer in turn sold to 
his customers who ·were the consumers. (Ex. 1). 
At the commencement of the trial and before any 
evidence "\Vas taken it was stipulated that the plaintiffs 
"Nere the owners of the tanks in question prior to the de-
livery of the property to Mr. Ervin C. Lay, a dealer, who 
in turn delivered possession of the tanks to the defend-
ants ( Tr. 4-5). There was no issue, therefore, concern-
ing the plaintiffs' ownership of the property up to the 
time they turned the possession over to the dealer Lay~ 
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"rho in turn delivered possession to the defendants. In 
other words, the defendants claim their title through Lay 
and/or the plaintiffs and not through any other person 
• 
or persons. 
On December 7th, 1946, a franchise agreement was 
prepared and signed by the plaintiffs as a distributor, 
and ]1Jrvin C. Lay, as a dealer, (Ex. 1). Lay did business 
t.ht~n under the name of "The Legas Company" and re--
sided at Circelville. Under the terms of the franchise 
I 
LRy was appointed as a dealer for the plaintiffs in han-
dling, selling and dealing in liquid gas and/ or gas burn-
ing equipment. The dealer agreed he would not purchase 
from anyone excepting the distributor any liquid gas 
and/or gas burning equipment which he might sell di-
rectly or indirectly in the territory allotted to him. Par-
agraph 3 of the franchise specifically provides as follows: 
3. Deale~ agrees to lease from distributor all 
tanks and appurtenant equipment. which shall be 
needed and used by him for the storing and keeping 
of liquid gas which shall be stored or kept on hand 
for sale by the dealer during the life of this agree-
ment. (Italics ours). 
Other pertinent provisions of the franchise are as 
follow: 
7. This agreement does not constitute dealer as 
agent or legal representative for distributor for 
any purpose whatsoever. Dealer is not granted any 
express or implied right or authority to assume or 
create any obligation or responsibility in behalf of 
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distributor or to bind distributor in any manner or 
thing whatever. 
5. Dealer agrees to maintain a place of busi-
ness satisfactory to distributor for use in storing 
and displaying gas burning equipment and merchan-
dise 'vhich he shall purchase through distributor 
for resale. · 
After the franchise agreement was executed the 
tanks in question " ... ere delivered to Mr. Lay, and there-
after the tanks were installed at the defendants' respec-
tive places of business. (Tr. 8~9-15-16). Defendants were 
customers of the dealer Lay. 
The distributor, not the dealer, was to serv1ce the 
leased storage tanks and equipment, the servicing to con-
~ist of plan tiff's trucks going to each place and refilling 
the tanks, and keeping the tanks in good repair, painting 
the signs, etc .. ( Tr. 12). Distributor painted the Johnson 
tank, checked the pressure line and placed a sign on the 
tank 'vhich stated ''This tank shall not be filled by anyone 
other than the LaFrentz Liquid Gas Company." (Tr. 13-
lD). 
About June 23, 1947, the dealer elected, under its 
terms, to terminate the franchise. (Ex. 3). After receiv-
ing the notice of termination and after the cancellation 
date of the franchise the distributor did not service the 
tanks because defendant Johnson commenced purchasing 
gas -from Ervin Lay, then operating independent of the 
p~aintiffs and under the name of ''Southern Utah Gas 
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(~ompany.'' Plaintiffs, however, stood ready, able and 
""'illing to continue such servicing and offered to do so. 
Defendants refused to accept the service. ·( Tr. 12-16-17, 
Exs. 4-5-7). 
Concerning the arrangement under which the stor-
age tanks· and appurtenant equipment was leased (not 
sold) to the dealer, plaintiffs as distributors not only re-
lied on the franchise agreement, but submitted to and pro-
cured from the defen¢lants a "rritten statement or agree- -
ment s·etting ~orth the conditions unde-r which these tanks 
"\Vere delivered and would be operated. Loraine Johnson, 
one of the partners in the b-o.siness known as Horseshoe 
Cafe, signed the agreement (Ex. 2), which proyided: 
THIS AGREEMENT, dated the ........ day of 
June, 1947, between LaFrentz Liquid Gas Company, 
party of the first part, hereinafter called ''Com-
pany,'' and Morris Johnson, party of the second 
part, hereinafter called '' Buy~r,' '-Witnesseth: 
1. Purchase of LaFrentz Lagas : Buyer shall 
purchase from Company all liquified petroleum gas 
used by buyer on buyer's premises locate.·d at Circle-
ville, Utah. The product sold hereunder shall be 
LaFrentz Legas in compa1~.y's cylinders delivered 
on buyer's order in company's customary manner. 
* * * * 
II. Rental of set: Buyer rents from Company 
one 320 gal. Cylinder No. D8922 LaFrentz Legas 
Dispensing Set and regulator complete with fittings 
delivered and assembled on said premises by Com-
pany, and buyer agrees to pay a labor and installa-
tion charge of $250.00 and a rental of $ n·one per 
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year for each and every year of this contract after 
the first year hereof. Such rental to be due and pay-
able in advance on each anniversary hereof. All 
property hereby rented shall at all times remain the 
property of and under control of company. _ ~uyer 
shall install and maintain the piping from the set 
to appliances at buyer's expense. Company shall 
have access to the set at all reasonable times and 
will remedy any mechanical defects in the set upon 
notice from buyer unless the set has been tampered 
'vith by buyer or other unauthorized person. Title 
to the set shall rerr/;ain in comp_any. The set shall 
not be moved from its o!iginal location except by 
company. If buyer should abandon the set, or upon 
any other breach by buyer of the provisions hereof, 
Company may remove the set forthwith and retain 
all rentals pre1Jio~tsly paid as liquidated damages. 
* * * (Under general provisions on reverse side of 
contract: If the set or cylinders, or any other prnp-
erty covered by this agreement becomes lost or dam-
aged beyond further effective use or if said prop-
erty or any part thereof ·is not returned to com-
pany promptl.y upon any termination of this agree-
ment, buyer shall forthwith pay company the cur-
rent market value of the particular article or art-
icles involved. .(Italics ours). 
The tank was received by the Johnsons on June 16, 
1947 (Tr. 47), and the agreement was signed on June 17th, 
1947, as shown by Exhibit 2. 
Robinson, one of the then partners in the R. & B. 
Cafe, signed a similar agreement (Ex. 6; Tr. 17 and 40). 
The defendant Blake testified that he received the 
tank now in his possession either in February or March 
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of 1947, and that he paid $350.00 to the Richfield Com-
mercial Bank for it, (Tr. 36). Payment was made to the 
account of the dealer Lay because Lay had borrowed some 
money from the Richfield bank. Blake also testified he 
had never seen Exhibit 6 w~ich was the·lease agreement 
signd by Robinson. At the time Robinson signed the 
agreement he. and Blake were partners operating the R. 
& B. Cafe. 
The defendant Johnson testified that he received the. 
320 gallon tank from Mr. Lay about July, 1947; that it 
was h_is understanding he bought the tank from Lay; that 
he bought about $1100.00 worth of equipment from Lay 
including the tank; that he knew nothing about the leas-
ing ag:reement his wife had signed, and although ·his wife 
told him she had signed it, he did not think it was worth 
anything and paid no attention to it. (Tr. 40 to 49). 
Ervin Lay testified that he signed the franchise 
agreement in J?ecember, 1946, and that it was signed on 
the 9th or 19th (Tr. 53). On cross-examination he testi-
fied it" was signed on the 9th, the day that property was 
first b~lled to him (Tr. 65-66). Exhibit 8 shows that a 
number of small 100 'lb. cylinders complete with regulat-
ors, etc., were billed on Dec. 9th, 1946 (Tr. 65-66), and on 
the invoice was written the following: ''The 100 lb. cylin-
ders remain the property of the LaFrentz Liquid Gas 
Company who ar~e the distributors for the dealer known 
as the LaGas Company, located at Circleville, Utah. 
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(Signed) Ervin C. Lay- F. H. LaFrentz." Lay admitted 
that after signing the franchise he had no different ar-
rangement with the plaintiffs concerning their business 
relations and the way equipment would be billed or 
charged to him than at the time the franchise was signed; 
that the first invoice of material billed to him was ·the 
cylinders (Exhibit 8); that there was no different ar-
rangement in acquiring possession and taking over the 
500 gallon and 320 gallon tanks than the arrangement 
concerning the cylinders (all being storage receptacles for 
holding of liquid gas and to be refilled when empty); 
that whatever the deal wa.s concerning the 100 pound cyl-
inders would be the same deal and arrangement concern· 
ing the larger tanks which were to be installed for cus-
tomers use- and to be refilled ( Tr. 66-67). 
The 320 gallon tank which went to J ohnsons, accord-
ing to exhibit "A" was billed to Lay on June lOth, 1947, 
long after the franchise agreement was signed, and the 
agreement, (Exhibit 2), signed by Loraine JohRson is 
dated in ,June, 1947. The 500 gallon tank which went to 
Blake was billed to Lay on Feb. 7, 1947, several months 
after the franchise was signed, and the agreement, (Ex-
hibit 6) signed by Robinson and Blake is dated Dec. 1946, 
but was actually signed a couple of months later, (Tr. 
30-32). Exhibit "A" shows that two 320 gallon tanks 
were billed to Lay at $300.00 or $150.00 each, and Exhibit 
"B" shows that the 500 gallon tank was billed at $250.00. 
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Exhibit 2 shows that the 320 gallon tank complete with fit-
tings was delivered to Johnson for a labor and installation 
or rental charge of $250.00, and Exhibit 6 shows that the 
500 gallon tank, complete with fittings, was delivered to 
R. & B. ·cafe for a labor and installation or rental charge 
of $350.00. No further rental could be charged to the 
customer who was entitled to keep the tank and fittings 
for at least five years so long as the custo.mer complied 
with the terms of the agreement (see last clause on re-
verse side of these agreemnts). The difference or ad-
. vance charge of $100.00 on each tank represented the deal-
er's profit _for handling, ~or his labor in making the instal·· 
lations, and hauling the equipment from Cedar City, etc. 
When plaintiffs sent Lay a statement, it carried items 
which were charged for appliances being sold outright to 
Lay, and for cylinders and tanks (which plaintiffs con-
tend 'vere being leased), the i terns being intermingled in 
invoices and state:ments. When a check was given by 
Lay to plaintiffs and marked ''payment on account'' or 
--
"paid," it might include payment for the appliances as 
well as charges made for tanks and cylinders that were to 
be installed for the use of customers and to be refilled 
when empty. (Tr. 63-64). 
Evelyn D. LaFrentz testified that she is the secretary 
and bookkeeper for the LaFrentz Company and that she 
makes out the invoices and sales slips, (Tr. 72); that in 
the handling of her office work, she used identical ·sales 
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slips· to record any transactions, which is done for the 
records in the offire because· the slips are numeriGally 
numbered; that the billing of tanks and cylinders and 
equipment used for storage purposes were handled by the 
use of the same kind of printed tickets as merchandise 
that was being sold outright. (Tr. 73-74). 
After the defendants refused to permit the plain-
tiffs to refill the storage tanks with liquid gas or other-
wise use the distributors' products, and after the defend-
ants refused to accept the· service of plaintiffs, but com-
menced doing business with Ervin Lay who was th~n 
operating independent of the plaintiffs, these plaintiffs 
brought the within actions to repossess their storage tanks 
and appurtenant equipment, and the defendants, contend-
ing that they purchased these tanks from Lay and are the 
o'vners thereof, have resisted such action. 
ASSIG NJ\tiENTS OF ERRO:& 
The plaintiffs and appellants herein assign the fol-
lo,ving errors committed by the trial court upon which 
they rely for a reversal of the judgment appealed from 
and for ari order of this court directing the trial court 
to enter a judgment as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint. 
Concerning Case No. 7360 in which Melvin Blake 
' 
is defendant : 
1. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 2 
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· (Abs. 12). While denominated as a finding, the state-
ment that the defendant is the owner and entitled to pos-
session of the tank, is a conclusion of law. Even though 
finding No. 2 be accepted as a finding, it is without sup-
port in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence in 
that plaintiffs' exhibits 1 and 6 show the tank to be leased 
property and not sold either to Ervin Lay or the defend-
ant Blake. 
· 2. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 3 
(Abs 12). That such finding is without support in the 
evidence and is contrary to the evidence in that plaintiff's 
exhibits 1 and 6 show that the property in such finding 
described was leased and not sold either to Ervin Lay or 
the defendant Blake. 
3. The trial court erred ·in making that portion of 
its finding No. 3 ''and that possession is rightful and 
valid." While such statement is denominated as a find-
ing, it is a conclusion of law." 
4. The trial court erred in failing to make any find-
ing showing when payment for said tank was made, to. 
whom, amount paid, or any circumstances showing wheth-
er payment was made as the purchase price of the tank 
or for _a rental thereof. 
5. That the trial court erred in making its conclu-· 
sion of law N o._l, (Abs. 13).. That such conclusion is 
without support in the evidence and is contrary to the law 
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applicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That 
such conclusion is not supported by any finding o ffact. 
6. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of la"" No. 2, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applic-
able to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such con-
clusion is not supported by any finding of fact. 
7. That the trial court erred in making and entering 
its decree in favor of defendant and against the plain-
tiffs (Abs. 14). That such decree is without support in 
the evidence and is without support of any finding or 
findings, and is contrary to law. 
8. That the trial court erred in not making ·and enter-
ing its decree in favor of the plaintiffs and against the de-
fendant as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint. 
Concerning Case No. 7361 in which Morris Johnson 
. 
and Loraine Johnson are defendants: 
1. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 2 
(Abs. 12). While denominated as a finding, the state-
ment that the defendant is the owner and entitled to pos-
session of the tank, is a conclusion of law. Even though 
finding No. 2 be accepted as a finding, it is without sup-
port in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence in 
that plaintiffs' exhibits 1 and 6 show the tank to be· leased 
property and not sold either to Ervin Lay or the defend-
ants Johnson. 
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2. The trial court erred in making its finding No. 3 
(Abs 13. That such finding is without support in the 
evidence and is contrary to the evidence in that plaintiffs' 
exhibits 1 and 6 show that the property in such finding 
~ . 
described was leased and not sold either to Ervin Lay or 
the defendants Johnson. 
3. The trial court erred in making that portion of its 
finding No. 3 "and that possession is rightful and valid." 
While such statement is denominated as a finding, it is a 
conclusion of law. 
4. The trial court erred in· failing to make any find-
ing sho"\\ring when payment for said tank was made, to 
whom, amount paid, or. any· circumstances showing wheth-
er payment was made as the purchase price of the tank 
or for a rental thereof. 
5. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law No. 1, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law ap-
plicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such 
conclusion is not supported by any finding of f'act. 
6. That the trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law No. 2, (Abs. 13). That such conclusion is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law applic-
able to the facts as shown by the evidence. That such 
conclusion is not supported by any finding of fact. 
7. That the trial court erred in making and entering 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
its decree in fnYor of defendants and against, the plain-
tiffs. (Abs. 14). That such decree is without support in 
the evidence and is without support of any finding or 
findings, and is contrary to law. 
8. That the trial court erred in not making and en-
tering its recree in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendants as prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The conclusions of law and the decrees are not sup-
ported by any findings of fact. 
We haYe set forth only eight assignments of error in 
each of the two cases at bar. Four of these assignments 
pertain to the findings of fact of the trial court, and four 
attack the conclusions of law and the decrees. 
It is the contention -of the appellants that there is no 
sufficient finding to support the conclusions of law or the 
decrees. By the decrees the defendants are declared to 
be the owners and entitled to possession of the disputed 
storage tanks with fittings. The conclusions of law set 
forth that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any right or 
interest in the property and that the defendants are the 
o"\\rners and entitled to the possession thereof. The court 
made only three findings. The first recites that plaintiffs 
are co-partners doing business as I.jaFrentz Liquid Gas 
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Company; that the defendants Johnson were co-partners 
doing business as Horseshoe Safe. (In the Blake case 
the court found that Blake was doing business as the R. 
& B. Cafe). 
The second finding :reads as follows : 
"The court finds that the defendants are the 
owners and entitled to the possession of the follow-
ing described property: 320 gallon liquid gas stor-
age tank No. D8922, complete with fittings and regu-
lator, being of the value of $200.00." 
The third finding reads as follows : 
''The court further finds that payment has been 
fully and completely made for the property herein-
above described, and that the possession is rightful· 
and valid. '' 
Outside of the value of the property being found to 
be $200.00, finding No. 2 is in reality a conclusion of law. 
If there were sufficient findings the court might conclude 
that the defendants are the owners and therefore entitled 
to possession, or the court might conclude that the defend-
ants were entitled to possession even though not the own-_ 
~rs. But where are there any findings in these cases from 
which the court might conclude ownership in the defend-
ants, or any findings as· to how the plaintiffs, stipulated 
to have been the owners of the property, were divested of 
or passed title~ The only statement in the so-called find-
ings that might possibly support the conclusions, is find-
ing No. 2 "that payment has been fully and completely 
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made for the property hereinabove described.'' The 
'Yords in that finding ''and that the po~session is right-
ful and Yalid'' state a conclusion of law. We submit that 
a mere finding that payment has been fully and com-
pletely made for the property, wiht nothing further to 
show· by 'vhom paid, when, amount, and particularly to 
"""hom, and 'vithout a finding whether paid for and on ac-
count of purchase price, or for and on account of lease 
rentals, forms no basis whatever for the conclusion that 
the defendants are the owners of the property. For in-
stance, payment made to one not the owner and having 
no right to sell, does not vest title to property in the per-
son making payment. Payment made to apply on rental 
does not constitute payment on the purchase price. Pay-
rnent of money by defendants to Ervin C: Lay, who had 
no legal right to sell and who had no title to the property 
'IVO'ltld not vest title in the defendants. 
It canot be determined from the findings on what 
theory or on what facts the court predicates its conclu-
sions of law and decr~es - whether on the fact that Lay 
had some agreement or arrangement as a modification to 
the franchise agreement; whether on the fact that for 
some reason or another the defendants were not bound 
by thir written rental agreement, acknowledging the tanks 
and appurtenances were leased property; or whether on 
the fact that the sales slip with the printed words thereon 
''sold to'' constituted a bill of sale and modification of 
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the written agreements. 
From the evidence, both oral and documentary, it is 
clear that it was never intended the storage tanks and 
appurtenances or fittings should be sold to Lay, but it 
'\\ras intended such tanks and equipment would remain the 
property of plaintiffs who would service the same by 
keeping in repair, painted, etc., and who would have the 
sole right to refill, either by themselves or through their 
dealer, with their own liquified gas. The franchise is 
clear on this proposition and should be conclusive as be-
tween the plaintiffs and their dealer Lay. When the de-
fendants made payments to Lay, they knew such storage 
tanks and equipment were leased, because they were ex-
,.. 
pressly so advised by plaintiffs and agreed that the 
I 
''lease'' consideration would be a stipulated figure ae 
rental, as shown in their signed agreements, exhibits 2 
and 6. The only business arrangement ever had or even 
discussed between plaintiffs and !.Jay was. the franchise 
arrangement reduced to writing, (Ex. 1); (Tr. 7-8). 
The testimony of Lay is conclusive that the tanks 
were never sold to him, that title never passed to him and 
that he was not justified in even believing that title 
passed to him. The evidence shows that as long as Lay 
was acting as plaintiffs' dealer he never made a claim 
to the ownership of the tanks, but when he cancelled 
the franchise agreement and went into the- liquid gas bus-
iness as their competitor, he then conceived the idea of 
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defendants, so the plaintiffs could not continue to serv-
ice the tanks and sell the refills. It is quite obvious that 
the only fact upon which Lay contends the tanks were 
purchased outright and not leased is because of one sales 
slip or _memorandum under which a charge was made to 
him by plaintiffs, and because of one statement submit-
ted to him by plaintiffs. 
An examination of Lay's testimony shows that he 
relies entirely on this sales slip or momerandum, and 
one statement, and disregards entirely his franchise 
agreement, and the understandings and dealings had with 
plaintiffs. Exhibit H was written by Lay and given to 
Johnson and shows a credit or payment of $556.83, with 
a charge of $100.00 for a steam table, and a balance of 
$400.00 on the ~ccount. There is nothing on this slip to 
show whether the credit "on gas job" was credit for pay-
ment of. a rental on tank or purchase of merchandise, or 
both. Johnson testified that when he made the payment 
of $556.83 it was a down payment which included the tank 
and other merchandise such as- hea.ting panels, etc. ( Tr. 
46). 
Lay did not testify to any specific conversation or 
arrangement of any kind wherein he purchased these 
tanks or wherein the tanks were delivered to him other 
' than under lease as set forth in the franchise, and in line 
\vith the understanding between the parties and their in-
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tentions. He did not even testify to any specific busi-
ness arrangement with the defendants under which he 
''sold'' the tanks to them, nor do they testify to any ar-
rangement either with plaintiffs or with Lay under which 
they were to acquire the title to the tanks rather than 
lease the same as provided in Exhibits 2 and 6. The evi-
dence upon which Lay must rely to show a purchase of 
the tanks from plaintiff is based on Exhibit A. Concern-
ing that exhibit Lay states ''it is a receipt for the pay-
ment of two 320 g~llon tanks which I received from Mr. 
LaFrentz'' (Tr. 54). One of the two. tanks mentioned 
in Exhibit A is the tank involved in the Johnson case. 
The slip or memo (called by Lay a receipt) is on a printed 
sales slip wherein the "\\7ords ''sold to'' are printed. The 
slip described the two tanks with a charge of $300 and 
written thereon are the words ''paid by check No. 029-
6/12/4 7. '' If the charge, under the terms of the fran-
chise, was a rental charge, then the rental charge was 
paid, and the statement "paid by check" does not imply 
the purchase price of the tanks was paid, or that the mere 
fact of payment changes a rental charge to a purchase 
price payment. Lay seems to contend that only because 
of Exhibit A, and irrespective of and contrary to any and 
all other agreements, intentions. and understandings, the 
tanks were sold to and paid for by him. Exhibit A was 
admitted in evidence, but its· admission was limited to the 
purpose of showing payment of $300.00 and ~ot to be con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
sidered in and of itself as a document transferring title 
(Tr. 55-6-7). 
As to the 500 gallon tank, Lay relies entirely on Ex-
hibit "B" to show his claimed title. This exhibit shows 
a statement of various charges - including $250.00 as the 
charge for each of two 500 gallon tanks, one of which is 
the tank involved in the Blake ·suit. The statement does 
not attempt to segregate rental charges for leased tanks 
and cylinders from charges for merchandise and appli-
ances being sold outright. ~Just how such a statement'can 
be construed as a bill of sale or how it can be construed 
to modify the franchise agreement and convert a rental 
into a sale, we cannot understand. Nothing in the find-
ings indicates the trial court's views. Exhibit "0" is 
a check from Lay to plaintiffs dated July 23rd, 1947, for 
$250.63 on which was written ''payment in full for all 
I.JaFrentz accounts.'' Those words .were scratched out 
and we assume were so scratched before the check was 
cashed. However, assuming such words remained, this 
check only shows payment of the LaFrentz ''accounts'' 
'vhich would include, of course, any moneys due for mer-
chandise and appliances sold ou.tright and for any rental 
charges due for leased merchandise. Lay did not testify 
that in making such final payment he and plaintiffs had 
any agreement or understanding that it paid for the pur-
chase price and not the lease-rental price for storage 
tanks. (See Tr. 61-2). He admitted freely that the check 
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represented articles other and in addition to the tanks) 
that the check balanced the account irrespective of wheth-
er it was for tanks or appliances. He also admitted that 
when plaintifs sent him a statement it included charges 
for tanks and cylinders, and those charges were inter-
mingled in tht statement with charges for appliances and 
articles being sold to him for resale to his customers. He 
admitted that a check given by him in payment would in-
clude payment for appliances as well as charges for tanks 
and cylinders (Tr. 64). 
It is significant that when the franchise was signed 
on Dec. 7th, 1946, as testified to by plaintiffs, or on Dec. 
9th, 1946, as testified to by Lay, the first statement or in-
voice given to Lay thereafter on Dec. 9th, 1946, contained 
· a rental charge of $1500.00 for 100 cylinders, an,d an ex-
press writing thereon to the effect that these cylinders 
remain the property of plaintiffs, which statement was 
signed by I.Jay (Ex. 8). These cylinders are small stor-
age tanks holding 100 lbs. for gas when full, and are in-
stalled mostly for household use. The 320 gallon and 500 
gallon tanks serve the same purp·ose, but hold more gas 
and are used by business houses and for commercial use, 
such as cafes, etc. It· appears that plaintiffs adopted 
the precaution of expressly writing into that first invoice 
the statement showing that title remained in them, not-
withstanding the franchise also so provided. After that 
it was not deemed necessary. vVhen Lay was on the 
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stand under cross-examination and before he was shown 
Exhibit 8 he testified as follows: 
Q. Now, did you have any arrangement with the 
LaFrentz Company 'vhether or not your method 
of acquiring possession and taking over tanks, 
such as this 500 gallon tank and the 320 gallon 
tank, was different from taking over the cylinr 
ders J? 
A. There was nothing said. 
Q. In other-· word~, do I understand that the ar-
rangement or deal, wh~tever it was between you 
and the LaFrentz people was the same concern-
ing any equipment that was to be installed or 
refilled whether it be these 100 pound cylinders 
or these larger tanks~ 
A. So far as I knew there was no difference. 
Q.· And whatever your deal was concerning 100 
pound cylinders would be the same type of deal 
and arrangement concerning other equipment, 
and these larger tanks which were to be installed 
for customers' use and to be refilled when 
empty. 
A. That's right. (Tr. 66-67). 
There is no evidence in the record that the franchise 
agreement was changed or modified, either orally or by 
writing. In fact, no change or modification was -even 
discussed. .There is no evidence in the record that the 
tanks in question or any tanks were delivered to Lay un-
der any arrangement or agreement other than under the 
franchise agreement, unless it is held that the printed 
• 
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words·" sold to·" on the slip or the inclusion of a lease 
rental charge on a statement constituted a change or modi-
fication of the previous arrangement, understanding, 
contract and intention. Attention is specifically called to 
the fact that there were neither discussions respecting, 
negotiations for, or agreements to make such change. ·The 
memorandum or slip containing the words "sold to" con-
cerns only the 320 gallon tank. The claim for the 500 
gallon tank is based on Exhibit B which is merely a state-
ment showing a charge,. but without expressly stating 
that the charge is for rental. No formal bill of sale or 
other writings, or oral statements, were given or made by 
plaintiffs to Lay, nor is it even claimed that any writings 
other than the exhibits mentioned were entered into or 
passed between the parties. 
It is quite obvious that had Mrs. LaFrentz written 
on the slip or on the statement the same notation as on 
the original invoice for the 100 cylinders, or had struck 
a pen through the words ''sold to'' on the slip, or had 
billed the 500 gallon tank on a statement separate from 
any other items, Lay would never have thought to claim 
he had ''purchased'' the tanks. But because she did not 
mistrust !.Jay and assumed that ordinary business deal-
ings between them would be in accordance with previous 
understanding, arrangement and intention, she did not 
take every precaution "to characterize each transaction 
separately and brand each transaction for what it was, 
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- as a sale or a lease rental. In the light of Exhibits. 2 
and 6 signed by the defendants acknowledging that the 
tanks were leased or rented, it is apparent that the de·-
fendants would never have claimed title to the tanks ·ex-
cepting for the claim of Lay in. the first instance and to 
assist Lay in claiming the right to refill th_e tanks with 
his own liquid gas. 
Plaintiffs call attention that by the execution of the 
LaFrentz Legas Combination Agreement (Exhibits 2 
and 6) defendants admitted that title to said tanks were in 
plaintiffs. While the defendants must claim title through 
Lay or not at all, and that payments made to Lay, no mat-
ter what the agreement between them and I~ay, _would not 
be binding on these plaintiffs, nevertheless it is signifi-
cant that they made their payments to Lay after admit-
ting title to be in plaintiffs by the execution of. the combi-
nation agreements. If defendants seek to avoid the effect 
of these agreements, has their testimony and evidence met 
the degree of proof required~ We think not. 
II. 
Title to the personal property did not pass to Lay 
merely because of a sales slip containi~g the words "sold 
to'' nor because of lease charges being included in a cer-
tain ''statement,'' when the, agreement, understanding 
and intention of the parties was that the personal prop-
Prty should bP leased and title remain in the plaintiffs. 
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And of course, unless Lay got title, the defendants through 
Lay could get no title. 
Under all the circumstances, the facts simmer down 
to this : By the facts hereinbefore set forth and not re-
peated here it appears beyond question or argument that 
plaintiffs were the owners of the tanks. prior to deli'very 
to Lay; that the tanks were delivered to Lay under the 
leasehold provisions of the franchise agreement and in 
,accordance with the acknowledged understanding of the 
parties that title remained in the plaintiffs; that Lay so 
understood that the tanks for stor~ge, distinguished from 
appliances for resale, were under title-retaining fea-
tures; that the first lot of tanks ( 100 100-lb. tanks) were 
delivered under express stipulation respecting the title-
·retaining. features (Exhibit No. 8) and Lay testi~ied 
flatly that nothing was said respecting any change of ar-
rangement, intention or understanding, that so far as he 
knew no different arrangement "\Vas made or contemplat-
ed, and that the larger tanks such as the two tanks in-
volved in these cases were delivered under exactly the 
same deal as the delivery of the 100 smaller tanks (Trans. 
66-67) about which there was and is absolutely no ques-
tion. 
The flat question presented ·is this : Did the mere 
billing of one tank on a sales slip containing the printed 
·form words ''sold to'' change the transaction between 
the parties .and constitute a bill of sale and pass title, and 
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did the mere inclusion of the billing of the second tank 
on a statement "rith other items similarly constitute a bill 
of sale and pass title~ And respecting the tank mentioned 
on the statement, 'vhere the statement does not specify 
"Thether the items are for resale or under lease or rental 
and indicates only the articles an~ amounts due, some 
being for resale and others for lease, does the inclusion of 
both classes ·of articles in one statement result in said 
statement constituting a bill of sale to all~ 
Under all the circumstances, and with. common and 
ordinary interpretation of business dealings, was this 
sufficient to change. the transactions and contracts be-
tween the parties~ Plaintiffs submit that this leads to a 
result illogical from either a factual or legal viewpoint. 
From a factual viewpoint and disregarding the law, there 
is indicated no intention by the plaintiffs or Lay to abro-
gate or change the agreements and understandings and 
intentions previously exhibited. On the contrary, Lay 
himself admits that there was no change of arrangement. 
From a legal viewpoint, it is submitted that there was no 
modification of the original agreement or understanding 
by which Lay was bound. 
It is true, without question, that a written or an oral 
contract can be subsequently modified orally. Parker v. 
Weber County Irri. District, 65 Utah 354, 236 Pac. 1105. 
But to constitute a modification the n1inds of the· parties 
must meet, and while the fact of agreement may be implied 
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. from a course of conduct, it is not sufficient even to show 
an ambiguous course of dealing from which one party 
might reasonably infer that the original contract was still 
in force, and the other party infer that it had been 
changed. See 17 C. J. S. Contracts, Sec. 375. In this case 
there was no meeting of the minds respecting a modifica-
tion of the previous agreement and understanding, and 
there was no course of conduct from which Lay could 
imply a change of agreement. To the contrary, he readily 
admitted there was no such change. (Trans. 66-67). While 
the circumstances do not even show an ambiguous course 
of dealing, the most that can be said for the situation is 
that the sales slip and the statement, upon which Lay 
relies, leads to an ambiguity but La.y could not reasonably 
infer that there was any change. 
ThP new or modified agreement must have all the 
requisites of a valid and enforceable contract, and mere 
indefinite expressions are not sufficient. 17 C. J. S. 
Contracts Sec. 37 4. Plaintiffs submit that there is no 
meeting of minds respecting the tanks and that they did 
not intend to pass title merely because they billed_ the 
lease rental consideration for the tanks on a business 
sales slip, and merely because they included a leasehold 
charge in a statement. 
Even assuming that Lay so understood the effect of 
the statement and sales slip, which cannot be the effect 
of the evidence and particularly his own admissions, still 
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it \Vould take something more definite, by mutual assent 
or understanding, to accomplish the result contended for 
by the defendants. 
But if the defendants, on the other hand, contend that 
the above principles do not apply, and contend that the 
sales slip and statement constitute a part of the entire 
transaction, rather than a modification, then plaintiffs 
point out that it is a fundamental rule of law that where 
there are ~everal separate instruments making up a con-
tract, or where several documents refer to the same tran-
saction, all of the several instruments or documents must 
be·construed together and with reference to each other. 
To have two or more writings construed to-
gether it is not necessary that one of them should 
refer to the other in express terms. If two or more 
writings are executed between the same parties and 
concerning the same subject matter, they may be 
construed together as a part of the same transac-
tion, at least in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. Thus a note and the contract under which 
it was made; a land contract. and a deed; * * * · a 
will, deed and contract; different written contracts 
and checks may in each case be construed together. 
Page on Contracts, 2nd Ed. Vol. 4, S~ec. 2046, at 
pages 3538-9. 
If two contracts are not executed at the same 
time, but refer to the same subject-matter, and on 
their face show that they were executed each as a 
means of carrying out the same intent as the other~ 
they should be construed together. Page · 3539, 
Page on Contracts, 2nd ~Jd. Vol. 4, Sec. 2046. 
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A contract and deed which is given in perform-
ance of such contract may be construed together, 
although they are executed several months apart. 
Warrants which are issued by a public board in pay-
ment for work labor and materials under a contract-
may be considered in connection with such contract 
in order to ascertain its meaning. A contract be-
tween A and B by which A agrees to purchase auto-
mobiles and- B agrees .to appoint A as B 's sales 
agent, is to be construed in connection with a bill 
of sale given as a pa:r:t of the same transaction. 
- (See Wilcox vs. Badger llotor Car Co., 99 Nebr.189, 
155 N. W. 891. Pages on Contracts;- pages 3541 and 
3542). 
Where a contract consists of several different 
instruments each document will be read and con-
strued with reference to the others, and the contract 
will, if possible, be given effect as a whole. Sterling 
vs. Head Camp Pac. Jurisdiction, etc., 80 Pac. 1110, 
28 Utah 526. 
This Court surely cannot construe the sales slip and 
the statement as instruments passing title, in view of the 
franchise agreement and the admitted understanding of 
Lay (Trans. 66-67). The words ''sold to'' printed on a 
'sales stlip (Exhibit H) of a type commonly us.ed by many 
- business is too general in language to modify or abrogate 
the specific provisions of the franchise agreement; and, 
the incluRion of the leasehold rental on the statement (Ex-
hibit B) has even less meaning, the statement purporting 
only to show an- amount due from Lay to plaintiffs by 
reason of the items containing in the statement, and not 
intending nor purporting to show the character of the 
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the la";r and the numerous authorities such printed words 
''sold to'' on the sales slip do not and cannot change the 
W'"ritten franchise agreement and make a sale of what is 
otherwise agreed shall be a rental. In other words, these 
general printed "\Vords on the sales slip do not modify an 
express agreement, and Lay testified without equivoca-
tion that there was no change of understanding. 
If an ambiguity exists respecting the meaning and 
intention of the sales slip, reference then must be made 
to all the surrounding circumstances, and in such event 
the result will be exactly the same as hereinbefore indi-
cated. 
It may be well to mention that a holding that the two 
tanks involved in these actions before this Court belong 
to the plaintiffs will resuJt in no loss or injury to the re-· 
spective defendants. They receive exactly what was con-
templated, i. e., the right to the use of the tanks in ac-
cordance with standard business practiee, pertaining to 
the use of liquified gas, and in accordance with the combi-· 
nation agreements (Exhibits 2 and 6) they signed respec-
tively in .June of 1947 and February of 1947. Further 
attention may be called to the fact that none of the de-
fendants were misled by the sales slip or the statement~ 
for there is no evidence that any of the defendants saw or 
kne'v of either of said documents. While it would be im-
material, for defendants could get no title from Lay if 
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title did not pass from plaintiffs to Lay, plaintiffs feel it 
well to point out that they will not be injured by a hold-
ing of this Court favorable to the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs and appellants respectfully submit that the 
decrees he ret of ore entered by the trial court in these two 
actions should be set aside, with directions to the trial 
court to recast its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and to enter judgments in favor of plaintiffs as prayed 
for in their complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, WILSON AND CLINE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
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